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Abstract
In the tradition of Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982), we provide a revealed
preference characterisation of the representative consumer. Our results are simple and comple-
ment those of Gorman (1953, 1961), Samuelson (1956) and others. They can also be applied
to data very readily and without the need for auxilliary parametric or statistical assumptions.
We investigate the application of our characterisation by means of a balanced microdata panel
survey. Our ￿ndings provide robust evidence against the existence of a representative consumer
for our data.
Acknowledgments: We are very grateful to Richard Blundell, Don Brown, Martin Browning,
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1 Introduction
The step from the economics of individual consumers￿ demands to the economics of aggregate
demand is a slippery one. It has, of course, long been a core question in economics and, in particular,
there has been an important literature on the problem of aggregation: the circumstances under
which it is possible to treat aggregate demand as if it were the outcome of choices being made by a
single, rational, optimising, normatively signi￿cant, representative consumer. These circumstances
are known to be very demanding. The best known results in this area are probably those of Gorman
(1953, 1961), who derived the conditions under which aggregate demand can be written a function
of prices and aggregate income alone.1 Gorman showed that such exact aggregation is possible if
and only if the Engel curves of consumers are all straight lines with a common slope. Moreover,
he showed that exact aggregation implies the existence of a normatively signi￿cant representative
consumer.
Although the concepts of exact aggregation and the representative consumer have a long tradi-
tion in the economics literature, they became most prominent after Lucas￿(1976) famous critique,
￿Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven. E. Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium. E-mail:
laurens.cherchye@kuleuven-kortrijk.be. Laurens Cherchye gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from the Re-
search Fund K.U.Leuven through the grant STRT1/08/004.
yInstitute for Fiscal Studies and University of Oxford, Department of Economics, Manor Road Building, Manor
Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom. E-mail: ian.crawford@economics.ox.ac.uk.
zECARES and ECORE, UniversitØ Libre de Bruxelles. Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50, 1050 Brussels, Belgium. E-
mail: bderock@ulb.ac.be. Bram De Rock gratefully acknowledges the European Research Council (ERC) for his
Starting Grant.
xNetspar, CentER, Tilburg University. P.O. Box 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: fred-
eric.vermeulen@uvt.nl. Frederic Vermeulen gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from the Netherlands Organi-
sation for Scienti￿c Research (NWO) through a VIDI grant.
1Exact linear aggregation is to be distinguished from exact nonlinear aggregation, where aggregate demand is a
function of some representative level of aggregate income, which itself can be a function of the distribution of income
over the individuals (see Muellbauer, 1975, 1976).
1which stimulated the new research programme on the microfoundations of macroeconomics. One
common feature of the ￿rst generation macromodels with solid microfoundations (with Kydland
and Prescott (1982) as, perhaps, one of the most well-known examples) is that they assume a rep-
resentative consumer.2 Notwithstanding the fact that macroeconomists nowadays fully recognise
the importance of heterogeneity (see, for example, Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2009), we
may safely argue that the representative consumer still plays a major role in many modern macro-
economic models and in macroeconomics textbooks (see, for example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler,
1999, Woodford, 2003, Uhlig, 2010, and Gourio, 2010).
In this paper we revisit the problem which Gorman addressed. We too seek necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for exact aggregation. However, we do this from a rather di⁄erent perspective,
that of the revealed preference tradition of Samuelson (1938, 1948), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973)
and Varian (1982). Rather than describing the restrictions on behaviour in terms of the derivatives
of certain unobservable functions (symmetry of the cross derivatives of the consumer￿ s cost function,
for example), this approach works by characterising them in terms of a ￿nite system of inequalities
involving the consumer￿ s observed choices only.
This exercise is of a certain amount of theoretical interest, but this is not our only motiva-
tion. Our motivation is also empirical. Revealed preference methods directly analyse the raw data
themselves using techniques from ￿nite mathematics. In contrast, methods based on the derivative
properties of functions require that the relevant functions are known, and since we never observe
functions, these have to be estimated. The conclusions from such an exercise necessarily rest jointly
on the validity of the hypothesis at stake plus a number of crucial auxiliary statistical assumptions
necessary to deliver consistent estimates of the functions of interest. Revealed preference methods
are, to a great extent, free of these auxiliary hypotheses, and so allow researchers to focus with
much greater clarity on the economic hypothesis at the core. Furthermore, they are applicable
when there are very few observations and hence when nonparametric statistical methods would be
infeasible. As such, using these methods we can assess the empirical validity of exact aggregation
without unnecessarily aggravating the analysis.
The cost of the revealed preference approach is that, due to its ￿nonparametric￿ nature, its
empirical content is rather weak compared to methods which assume full knowledge of demand
functions, cost functions, and the like.3 In the present context this might turn out to be an
advantage. This is because the microeconometric evidence, based as it is on estimated derivatives
of demand functions, has been strongly anti the representative consumer. Papers which consider the
question of whether or not the representative consumer exists have therefore tended to take a rather
funereal tone (see especially Kirman, 1992, and Carroll, 2000). The greater empirical ￿ exibility of
the revealed preference approach, by contrast, has the potential to allow us to conclude that reports
of the death of the representative consumer may in fact been ￿greatly exaggerated￿ .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation
and some core concepts with respect to the individual consumer. Then, we distinguish between the
positive and the normative representative consumer (only the latter plays a meaningful role from a
welfare economics point of view). We also state the revealed preference conditions for the existence
of a normative representative consumer given a socially optimal income distribution rule (following
Samuelson, 1956). It will turn out that these conditions are di¢ cult to test because they are
nonlinear in nature. Nonetheless we can derive an empirically feasible test of a slightly strengthened
de￿nition of a normative representative consumer. This test requires a speci￿c assumption on the
distribution of either the marginal utility of income at the micro level or the social weights at the
macro level.
Importantly, because our characterisation in Section 2 is de￿ned for a given income distribution
rule, it does not guarantee exact linear aggregation (which requires that aggregate demand depends
2At this point, it is worth indicating that the representative consumer actually does not only feature in the
macroeconomics literature. It is also a cornerstone in some of the most important micromodels. See, for example,
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
3See Beatty and Crawford (2011) for more discussion.
2only on the aggregate income). However, it does provide a useful ￿rst step towards establishing
the revealed preference conditions for such exact aggregation. This is discussed in Section 3, which
contains the core contribution of this paper. Speci￿cally, we here investigate the link between the
conditions derived in Section 2 and the well-known Gorman aggregation conditions. Along the
way we also provide a revealed preference characterisation of Gorman Polar Form preferences for
an individual consumer (which is surprisingly weak from an empirical point of view) and, based
upon this characterisation, we propose an easy-to-implement necessary and su¢ cient test for the
existence of a normative representative consumer that holds for all possible income distributions
across consumers. Interestingly, we can show that this test is empirically equivalent to the test
developed in Section 2 (for aggregation ￿ la Samuelson, 1956, assuming a socially optimal income
distribution) under a fairly weak data requirement.
In Section 4 we bring our testable implications to a balanced microdata panel of Spanish house-
holds. Our application proceeds in two steps. Firstly, we test the conditions for exact linear
aggregation for all the rational households in our sample. A main conclusion here will be that the
conditions are systematically rejected, even when they are applied to small, highly homogeneous
groups of households. Given this, we subsequently analyse the unobservable heterogeneity across
households that causes this rejection. As we will show, our revealed preference methods (applied
to panel data) are well-suited for investigating such inter-household heterogeneity. Section 5 o⁄ers
some conclusions regarding the prospects for revivifying the representative consumer.
2 Samuelson revealed: a ￿rst characterization of the positive
and normative representative consumer
In this section we introduce some ￿rst concepts and results that will be useful for our following dis-
cussion. We start by brie￿ y reviewing the revealed preference conditions for rational consumption
behaviour of individual consumers. Next, we make the distinction between the positive and the
normative representative consumer, and we will argue that the latter concept is the only meaningful
one from a welfare economics perspective. Subsequently, we derive necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tions for the existence of such a normative representative consumer for a given, socially optimal
income distribution rule. Essentially, this provides a revealed preference treatment of the aggre-
gation concept originally considered by Samuelson (1956). It sets the stage for our discussion in
Section 3, where we will consider the revealed preference characterisation of exact linear aggregation
￿ la Gorman (1953, 1961), which implies a normative representative consumer independent of the
income distribution.
Individual rationality. Suppose that we have a balanced microdata panel of consumers indexed
by h = 1;:::;H observed over a number of periods indexed t = 1;:::;T. Following Gorman (1953),
we make the classical assumption that the law of one price holds and that prices are strictly positive
K-vectors (pt 2 RK
++). For each consumer h we observe non-negative quantities qh
t 2 RK
+. We





t2￿ , with ￿ = f1;:::;Hg and ￿ = f1;:::;Tg being the index
sets for consumers and periods, respectively. We will use Qt =
P
h2￿ qh
t to denote the aggregate
demand vector in period t, so that the macrodata are fpt;Qtgt2￿. Aggregate income is denoted by





In what follows, we will assume that all the consumers are rational in the sense that observed
demand results from the maximisation of a well-behaved utility function subject to an individual
budget constraint. Throughout, we will assume utility functions that are nonsatiated, monotonically
increasing, concave and continuous.
De￿nition 1 (Individual rationalisation) A utility function uh provides an individual ratio-














Before we focus on aggregate demand, it is useful to discuss the empirical content of individual
rationalisation. A core result in the revealed preference approach to demand is that there exists a





t2￿ if and only if the
data satisfy the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).




































In other words, the bundle of quantities qh





t ) if qh
s were chosen when qh




t ); see condition
(A). Next, the revealed preference relation Rh exploits transitivity of preferences; see condition (B).
Finally, condition (C) imposes that the bundle of quantities qh
t cannot be more expensive than
revealed preferred quantities qh
s.
We can now state the following result, which is usually referred to as Afriat￿ s Theorem (Varian,
1982; based on Afriat, 1967):
Theorem 1 (Afriat￿ s Theorem) The following statements are equivalent:
(1.A). There exists a nonsatiated, monotonic, concave and continuous utility function uh that pro-












(1.C). For all s;t 2 ￿, there exist numbers uh
s; uh
t 2 R+ and ￿
h




















t2￿ can be rationalised by a well-behaved utility function if and only if these
price-quantity pairs satisfy GARP. Next, the equivalent statement (1:C) de￿nes so-called Afriat
inequalities, which are expressed in the unknowns uh
t and ￿
h
t . These Afriat inequalities allow us
to obtain an explicit construction of the utility levels and the marginal utility of income associated
with each observation t: they de￿ne a utility level uh
t and a marginal utility of income ￿
h
t (associated
with the observed income p0
tqh
t ) for each observed qh
t . Importantly, as has been demonstrated by
Varian (1982), and later by Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008), the above insights can
be used to formally evaluate policy reforms in terms of individual welfare.





t2￿ and fpt;Qtgt2￿) in terms of a represen-
tative consumer. An important thing to note here is that there are actually two main personi￿cations
of this representative consumer.
The positive representative consumer. The positive representative consumer exists whenever
aggregate demand can be modelled as the outcome of rational, maximising behaviour given prices
and aggregate income. The positive representative consumer can be thought of as having classically
well-behaved preferences, but those preferences need not have any normative signi￿cance.4 As
Gorman (1976) aptly put it, the positive representative consumer is
￿rather an odd chap ...he is as likely as not to be radiantly happy when those he repre-
sents are miserable and vice versa￿
Gorman (1976) reprinted in Blackorby and Shorrocks (1995).
4See, for example, Dow and Werlang (1988), Kirman (1992) and Jerison (1994).
4The revealed preference characterisation of this ￿odd chap￿ was given by Varian (1984) and
turned out to be simple: the macrodata fpt;Qtgt2￿ must satisfy GARP. This is very easily testable
and does not involve any parametric assumptions about the form of the macro-utility function.5
Whilst the positive representative consumer is a potentially useful character upon which one
can base macro-level predictions, the trouble with him is, as Gorman (1976) was pointing out, that
he is not fully ￿representative￿in the welfare sense - none of the implied aggregate utility functions
associated with his preferences can necessarily be thought of as a social welfare function. As a
result the positive version of the representative consumer cannot be used for welfare analysis. We
therefore say farewell to the positive representative consumer at this point and focus entirely on his
more interesting and socially conscious cousin: the normative representative consumer.
The normative representative consumer. The normative representative consumer is a special
case of the positive representative consumer. Like the positive consumer he also exists whenever
aggregate demands can be modelled as the outcome of rational, maximising behaviour given prices
and aggregate income. However, the normative consumer￿ s preferences can properly be regarded
as an aggregate social welfare function. This makes him a much more useful construction: you can
use him both to make predictions and to make welfare statements. The normative representative














qh = Yt, (1)
where Yt is aggregate income and where u1;:::;uH and V are well-behaved utility functions. The
question we focus on concerns the conditions under which the microdata and the associated macro
behaviour can be rationalised by this model. In what follows, we derive these conditions under
the assumption that some income distribution rule guarantees a socially optimal distribution of the
aggregate income over the individual consumers. We return to this income distribution rule concept
in more detail at the end of this section.
The following de￿nes what it means for data to be rationalised by the preferences of a normative
representative consumer (when assuming a socially optimal income distribution rule).
De￿nition 3 (Normative representative consumer rationalisation) The utility functions V ,
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This is simply a statement of the principle of revealed preference in the relevant context: that
the normative representative consumer￿ s utility function should associate a higher real number with
the observed allocation of resources than it does for any a⁄ordable alternative allocation. The next
result presents the conditions under which there exists a normative representative consumer who
rationalises the data (the proofs of this and all of the following results are in the Appendix).
Theorem 2 The following statements are equivalent:
(2.A). There exist nonsatiated, monotonic, concave and continuous utility functions V;u1;:::;uH






5See, for example, Crawford and Neary (2008) for an application to country level consumption data.
6See, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), 4.D.1B, p.125. We note that the normative repre-
sentative consumer￿ s utility function has the same structure as a latently separable (Gorman, 1968, 1978, Blundell
and Robin, 2000, and Crawford, 2006) utility function - except for the important di⁄erence that the micro-level
allocations to individuals are not latent; they are observed.
5(2.B). For all s;t 2 ￿ and h 2 ￿, there exist numbers Vs;Vt;uh
s;uh
t 2 R+ and ￿t;bh
t 2 R++ such
that
Vs ￿ Vt + ￿tb0















with ut = (u1
t;:::;uH
t )0 and bt = (b1
t;:::;bH
t )0:
Some remarks are in order. Firstly, similar to before, this is an equivalence result, so the condi-
tions in statement (2:B) are both necessary and su¢ cient: if there exist solutions to the inequalities
then the microdata are exactly reproducible by the model of the normative representative consumer
with suitable, well-behaved utility functions; equally, if solutions to these inequalities do not exist
then neither do suitable, well-behaved utility functions capable of rationalising the data. Secondly,
condition (2:B:2) is an Afriat inequality which applies to each consumer in the microdata, and it
is equivalent to the statement that the microdata on each consumer, taken one-at-a-time, satis￿es
GARP. What this means is that it is a necessary condition that every consumer is rationalisable by
a well-behaved, individual utility function. This, of course, is entirely natural: if the representative
consumer is to be normatively signi￿cant, it is clearly necessary that those he is intended to rep-
resent are themselves rationalisable. Note that individual preferences are allowed to be arbitrarily
heterogeneous across consumers and can take any form - the only restrictions are that these individ-
ual preferences must be rational and well-behaved. Thirdly, condition (2:B:1) is an Afriat inequality
that captures the existence of a well-behaved utility function that aggregates the consumer￿ s utility
functions. Finally, whilst the form of Theorem 2 is entirely di⁄erent to the kind of results found in
the exact aggregation literature, which makes use of derivative properties of functions (there are no
functional forms, in particular there is nothing which indicates any kind of homotheticity, and there
is nothing which relates in an obvious way to the marginal utility of income), the Afriat numbers in







t2￿ ; for example, can be interpreted as utility levels and the marginal util-
ity of income at each observed choice for consumer h.7 Similarly, the numbers fVt;￿tgt2￿ can be
interpreted as a measure of aggregate welfare and the marginal social utility of income. Note that
neither the distribution of the marginal utility of individual income or the marginal social utility
of income are restricted other than via their interaction in (2:B:1). This interaction is important,
however, so we turn to it next.
The conditions in (2:B) provide a characterisation of the necessary and su¢ cient empirical condi-
tions for a normative representative consumer. They are also very general - there are no restrictions
on micro-preferences other than well-behaved-ness and none at all on the type or distribution of
unobservable heterogeneity. However, there is a di¢ culty: these conditions are not fully testable.
This is because the Afriat numbers in (2:B) are not unique. What this means in practice is that
as soon as the investigator ￿nds a solution to the inequalities, the search stops and a normative
representative consumer is known to exist. However, if after searching for a while no solution has
been found, the only option is to keep searching. Unfortunately, the set of possible Afriat numbers
is in￿nite and it would take forever to exhaust them. Conditions like this are sometimes said to
have a bias towards acceptance - simply because a falsi￿cation result would take an in￿nite amount
7To explain more in detail: given that the individual utility function uh is concave (and assuming di⁄erentiability



























non-purchase of some goods), where 1=bh
t represents the value of the Lagrange multiplier in the budget constraint.





















the same form as condition (2:B:2). So maximisation of the real-valued utility function means that there exist real
numbers uh





t which bear the required interpretation. See Varian (1982) for further discussion.
6of time to determine while an acceptance, by de￿nition, does not.8
The di¢ culty can be thought of as follows: in order for the observed distribution of resources
to be optimal, the representative consumer needs to equalise the marginal social utility of income
across consumers. Arguing loosely from the chain rule, marginal social utility can be thought of
as the individual￿ s marginal utility of income multiplied by the marginal contribution of individual










). Therefore the term ￿tbt represents a tangle of
unobservables which make (2:B:1) nonlinear in unknowns. It is this which gives rise to the problem
of in￿nite testability.
In order to make progress towards a computationally feasible necessary and su¢ cient condition
it is going to be necessary to simplify the interaction between individual marginal utility and social
weights. We explore this further next.
Theorem 3 The following statements are equivalent:
(3.A). There exist nonsatiated, monotonic, concave and continuous utility functions V , u1;:::;uH,
with common marginal utility of income, that provide a normative representative consumer ratio-






(3.B). There exist nonsatiated, monotonic, concave and continuous utility functions V , u1;:::;uH,
for which V is additively separable in u1;:::;uH, that provide a normative representative consumer






(3.C). For all s;t 2 ￿ and h 2 ￿, there exist numbers uh
s;uh














What this result says is that we can either tie down the social weights to be the same across
consumers (i.e. have a utilitarian social welfare function; statement (3:B)) or we can tie down
the marginal utility of income to be the same across consumers (statement (3:A)). Either way,
what this does is simplify the inequalities in Theorem 2 to a single (and crucially) linear problem
(statement (3:C)). This inequality is very straightforward to test and does not su⁄er from the
bias-towards-acceptance problem - it is determinable in ￿nite time.
Income distribution rule. To conclude this section, it is important to emphasise that Theorems
2 and 3 both imply the existence of an income distribution rule that distributes aggregate income
optimally from a social point of view (i.e. in the sense of Samuelson, 1956, and according to the so-
cial welfare function in (1)). Formally (and within the framework of the functional-derivative based
literature), an income distribution rule is a family of functions
￿




h2￿ wh (p;Y ) = Y for all p and Y . In case there is an income distribution rule, then






, where gh (:;:) is consumer h￿ s vector-valued demand associated with
this consumer￿ s preferences. Further, aggregate demand is the result of the representative con-
sumer￿ s preference relation that is represented by the social welfare function (1). Consequently,
Theorems 2 and 3 imply constraints on the possible income distributions in general; this is because
the aggregate demand generally depends on the income distribution rule (see Samuelson, 1956, Jeri-
son, 1994, and Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, for further discussion). In the next section,
we consider the same question but now we will consider the existence of a normative representative
consumer independent of the income distribution. This is essentially the question that Gorman
(1953) originally addressed: it asks for the revealed preference conditions associated with exact
linear aggregation. Interestingly, we will show that the conditions in Theorem 3 also characterise
the Gorman-type normative representative consumer under a very weak data requirement.
8This problem is closely related to revealed preference tests for weak separability (Varian, 1983). Also these
necessary and su¢ cient tests turn out to be based on a nonlinear system of inequalities, which is empirically less
attractive. A number of alternative separability tests have been proposed, which are either necessary or su¢ cient.
See, for example, Swo⁄ord and Whitney (1987, 1994) and Fleissig and Whitney (2003, 2008).
73 Gorman revealed: exact linear aggregation
We next investigate the conditions needed to guarantee exact linear aggregation, i.e. aggregate
demand only depends on aggregate income and is not a⁄ected by how the income is actually
distributed across consumers. From the functional derivative-based literature, we know that this
independence result applies if and only if consumers have preferences of the Gorman Polar Form
and linear Engel curves with common slopes. As demonstrated by Gorman (1953, 1961), this
implies that aggregate demand can be written in the simple form Q = g(p;Y ), where g(:;:) is the
vector-valued demand equation that results from the maximisation of the normative representative
consumer￿ s preferences given aggregate income Y and taking as given market prices p. Clearly, this
requires that any income distribution, such that
P
h2￿ yh = Y , gives rise to the same aggregate
demands Q; this is guaranteed by the conditions as they have been stated in Theorem 3 (or Theorem
2).
Our following discussion, however, will show a close link between the result in Theorem 3 and
Gorman-type aggregation. We proceed in four steps. Firstly, we derive a revealed preference char-
acterisation of individual preferences of the Gorman Polar Form. Secondly, we show the remarkable
and important result that if observed prices are nonproportional, then GARP is equivalent to having
preferences of the Gorman Polar Form. In practice, this data requirement is very weak: it is met for
the application that we present in the next section and, indeed, we are not aware of observational
(non-experimentally generated) data on consumer behaviour which exhibits price-proportionality.
Next, we provide the revealed preference counterpart to Gorman￿ s aggregation results and show
that, in the revealed preference sense, aggregate demand is independent of the income distribution
if and only if all consumers have preferences of the Gorman Polar Form with common marginal
utilities of income. In other words, all consumers are associated with parallel linear Engel curves.
Finally, we propose an easy-to-apply linear test for a normative representative consumer, which
holds for any possible income distribution, by combining the above steps. Interestingly, as we
will discuss, the linear condition that is tested is empirically equivalent to the condition (3:C) in
Theorem 3.
Gorman Polar Form preferences. We begin by de￿ning what it means for the data of an
individual consumer to be rationalisable with the Gorman Polar Form. The Gorman Polar Form is
usually de￿ned in terms of an indirect utility function wh. Let yh represent the income of consumer







We can now state the next de￿nition.






by the Gorman Polar Form if they are rationalisable by a utility function uh (in the sense of




bh(p) , with ah(p) 2 R and
bh(p) 2 R++ for all p and the functions ah and bh linearly homogeneous of degree 1.
In this de￿nition, the price index ah(p) is often interpreted as subsistence expenditure - although
this interpretation is not always valid (see Pollak, 1971, p 403, fn 4) - while the price index bh(p)
is interpreted as the inverse of the marginal utility of income.
Before moving on it is worth pointing out the well-established fact that the Gorman Polar Form
does not necessarily give rise to well-behaved preferences in all parts of the quantity-space: in gen-
eral, well-behaved preferences only apply to a limited range of possible income values; and therefore
Gorman Polar Form preferences are de￿ned in terms of boundary conditions for the possible in-
8come levels.9 To keep the exposition simple, our following analysis only considers income values
that lie within this range; and, thus, we will not explicitly consider the income boundary values.
More speci￿cally, we restrict attention to the cases in which preferences are both representable by
the Gorman Polar Form and rational. This is because (as pointed out above) the existence of the
normative representative consumer requires consumers to be utility-maximisers. We can now give
the characterisation.10






t2￿ are rationalisable by the Gorman Polar Form.
(4.B). For all s;t 2 ￿; there exist numbers wh
s; wh
t 2 R+, ah
t 2 R and bh































s if pt = ￿ps for ￿ > 0: (4.B.3)
As before the Afriat numbers in this result have certain structural interpretations. Condition
(4:B:1), for example, is again an Afriat inequality, which has a directly similar interpretation as
before. In this inequality, we can interpret each number wh
t as an indirect utility value (the function
value wh(p;yh) in De￿nition 4, which equals the utility value uh ￿
qh￿
under rational consumer
behaviour). Condition (4:B:2) then states the Gorman Polar Form restriction, with the numbers
ah
t and bh
t corresponding to the price indices ah(p) and bh(p) in De￿nition 4 evaluated at pt.
Condition (4:B:3), ￿nally, imposes linear homogeneity of these price indices.
Two further notes are in order. First, the Gorman Polar Form characterisation in Theorem 4
is nonlinear in ah
t and bh
t . However, in our proof of Theorem 4 we show that it can be equivalently
expressed in linear form. In turn, this makes it easily testable.
The second remark combines the results in Theorems 1 and 4. In particular, it follows that, under
the weak data requirement of nonproportional prices, Gorman Polar Form preferences provide no
additional restrictions over and above the standard Afriat inequalities (or, equivalently, GARP).11
In other words, Gorman Polar Form preferences and rational preferences are nonparametrically (in
the revealed preference sense) equivalent: for data in which proportional prices movements are not
observed their empirical implications are identical. This result is formally stated as follows:













This is an important result. It implies that if the data satisfy GARP and observed prices are
nonproportional, then we can always construct an indirect utility function which exactly rationalises
the data with the Gorman Polar Form. This is perhaps surprising as the Gorman Polar Form is
usually thought of as a very demanding restriction. However, it seems that this is only the case
9See, for example, Pollak (1971) and Blackorby, Boyce and Russell (1978) for a more detailed discussion on the
local nature of Gorman Polar Form preferences. As we explain in the Appendix, similar boundary conditions are
needed to prove Theorem 4.
10An alternative revealed preference characterisation of the Gorman Polar Form can be found in work in progress
by Brown and Shannon. In a certain sense, the work of these authors is complementary to ours as Brown and
Shannon characterise Gorman Polar Form preferences in terms of so-called ￿ dual￿Afriat numbers (which have an
interpretation in terms of of indirect utility functions; see Brown and Shannon, 2000), whereas our analysis starts
from the original ￿ primal￿Afriat numbers (to be interpreted in terms of direct utility functions). We thank Don
Brown for revealing this to us in a private conversation.
11Speci￿cally, under nonproportional prices condition (4:B:3) becomes redundant. Then, one can easily verify that,
for any given solution for the Afriat inequalities (4:B:1), there also exists a solution for condition (4:B:2).
9when proportional prices are observed in the data. In such a case, the Gorman Polar Form is
extremely demanding as we can directly observe points on an Engel curve and this Engel curve
must be perfectly straight. However, we are not aware of any observational (non-experimentally
generated) consumer panel data in which proportional prices changes are ever observed. Thus, it
turns out that, empirically, the Gorman Polar Form is without additional empirical content from a
revealed preference point of view.12
Exact linear aggregation. We can now use these insights to provide the revealed preference
counterparts of Gorman￿ s conditions for exact linear aggregation. As stressed above, exact linear
aggregation implies a normative representative consumer for any income distribution and thus
does not restrict attention to a particular income distribution rule. Gorman proved that such
exact aggregation holds if and only if consumers￿preferences are of the Gorman Polar Form with
common slopes for the (linear) Engel curves. In revealed preference terms, we get the following
characterisation.






(5.A). Aggregate demand is independent of the income distribution.
(5.B). For all s;t 2 ￿ and h 2 ￿, there exist numbers wh
s; wh
t 2 R+, ah



























s and bt = ￿bs if pt = ￿ps for ￿ > 0: (5.B.3)
As compared to Theorem 4, the key requirement is that the Afriat number bt is common across
consumers who face the same prices (i.e. bh
t = bt for all h). In terms of De￿nition 4, this e⁄ectively
imposes Gorman Polar Form preferences with a common b(p) index for all consumers. The idea is
that the marginal utility of income must be independent of income variations across consumers but
can vary with prices. Without these restrictions on the individual preferences (and, by implication,
on the preferences of the normative representative consumer), one typically has to assume some
income distribution rule (as discussed in Section 2). We note, ￿nally, that our characterisation in
Theorem 5 can be linearised in a directly similar way as our earlier characterisation in Theorem 4.
As such, it implies an easy-to-apply test for a normative representative consumer that is independent
of the income distribution.
Interestingly, the characterisation in Theorem 5 also generalises several special cases that gener-
ate the same independence of the income distribution. Two important examples are Varian￿ s (1983)
revealed preference characterisation of identical homothetic preferences (where ah (p) = 0 in Def-
inition 4) and Brown and Calsamiglia￿ s (2007) revealed preference characterisation of quasi-linear
preferences (where ah (p) = ￿pi￿(p) and bh (p) = pi, with pi the price of the numeraire and ￿ a
homogeneous of degree one function).
As a ￿nal result, we connect the characterisations in Theorems 2 and 5. Similar to Corollary
1, we ￿nd that if observed prices are nonproportional, then a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for a Gorman-type normative representative consumer is that each consumer satis￿es the standard
Afriat inequalities with a common marginal utility of income. This is formally stated in the following
result:
Corollary 2 The following statements are equivalent when prices pt 6= ￿ps (￿ > 0) for all s;t 2 ￿:
(A). Aggregate demand is independent of the income distribution.
12At this point it is worth recalling that we focus on preferences taking the Gorman Polar Form for income values
within bounded ranges, which here means that the equivalence in Corollary 1 has a local nature by construction.
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Thus, we get exactly condition (3:C) for aggregate demand to be independent of the income
distribution. This means that, under nonproportional prices, the condition in Theorem 5 conve-
niently reduces to the condition in Theorem 3. In other words, under the weak data requirement
of nonproportional prices, the characterisation of a normative representative consumer in Theorem
3 holds for all income distributions across consumers and no longer relies on the existence of an
income distribution rule. On the other hand, if prices are proportional, then the condition in Corol-
lary 2 (or condition (3:C) in Theorem 3) is not empirically equivalent to the one in Theorem 5. In
that case, it still (but only) de￿nes a necessary (and not su¢ cient) test for exact linear aggregation:
if the condition is violated we can (only) conclude that there certainly does not exist a normative
representative consumer that is independent of the income distribution.
4 An application
In the previous section we established the revealed preference conditions for exact linear aggregation.
Such exact aggregation e⁄ectively implies the existence of a normative representative consumer that
is independent of the income distribution, which is the most commonly used concept of represen-
tative consumer in the economics literature. Our characterisation provides the revealed preference
counterparts of Gorman￿ s conditions that have played a crucial role in the functional-derivative
based literature. Importantly, the characterisation can be linearised in unknowns, which makes it
easily testable.
We will next illustrate our revealed preference based aggregation results by means of an empir-
ical application. Here, it is worth to recall from our discussion in the Introduction that revealed
preference methods are intrinsically ￿nonparametric￿ : in contrast to the more standard functional-
derivative based methods, they do not need auxiliary parametric or statistical assumptions. As
such, our empirical revealed preference analysis avoids unnecessary aggravation and should thus
lead to robust conclusions on the existence of the normative representative consumer (for the data
at hand).
One preliminary remark is in order. It pertains to the fact that prices in our application are
nonproprortional (see below). As explained at the end of Section 3, nonproportional prices make
that our conditions for exact linear aggregation are empirically equivalent to those for a normative
representative consumer under a socially optimal income distribution rule. As a result, while we will
interpret our following results in terms of aggregation ￿ la Gorman (1953, 1961), it is important
to keep in mind that the same results may actually also be given a speci￿c meaning related to
aggregation ￿ la Samuelson (1956).
Rationalisability by the Gorman Polar Form. The data we use are drawn from the Span-
ish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF). This is one of the few surveys with detailed
expenditure information for a panel of households. The ECPF is a quarterly budget survey of
Spanish households which interviews about 3200 households every quarter.13 We focus on a sub-
sample of couples (with or without children), in which the husband is in full-time employment in
a non-agricultural activity while the wife is out of the labour force. This choice is driven by the
fact that we want to minimise the impact of possible nonseparabilities between consumption and
leisure. To keep things simple, we restrict attention to a balanced panel of households.14 Given
the construction of the ECPF, households can be interviewed for up to eight consecutive quarters.
13See Crawford (2010) for more detailed information about the ECPF.
14Thus, our empirical analysis uses households/families as consumers. As Samuelson (1947, p.224) pointed out,
￿Attention should also be called to the fact that even the classical economist does not literally have the individual
11However, our sample would be rather small if we would focus on those households observed for a full
eight period. Therefore, we have drawn a balanced panel of 342 households which are observed 5
times in order to balance the desire for a reasonable number of observations both across households
and time. In what follows, we focus on a set of 15 nondurable commodity groups.15 We note that
the 5 observed price vectors are nonproportional.
Our following analysis proceeds in two steps. First we check, individual household by individual
household, whether observed behaviour is rationalisable by the Gorman Polar Form, albeit with
heterogeneous bh(p) indices for the di⁄erent households h. In the second step we then pool the data
across households to investigate the conditions for exact linear aggregation. As discussed above,
such aggregation essentially requires a common b(p) index for the di⁄erent households (i.e. bh (p) =
b(p) for all h).
The ￿rst requirement for exact linear aggregation is that each individual household acts as of it
were maximising its own well-behaved utility function. We ￿rst check this condition by testing the
Afriat inequalities for each household individually (i.e. without pooling the data). That is, we use
linear programming to check, for each household h and for all observations s;t 2 ￿, whether there
exist numbers uh
s;uh
t 2 R++ and bh















In light of Corollary 1 and the fact that our data does not exhibit proportional price movements,
it is important to note that if a household￿ s consumption choices satisfy these inequalities it means
more than just the fact that they are rationalisable by well-behaved preferences. It also implies that
they can be rationalised by preferences of the Gorman Polar Form. In this interpretation, bh
t equals
household h￿ s price index bh (p) when prices are pt. The results of this procedure are reported in
Table 1.




It turns out that the behaviour of 95% of the households in our data is exactly rationalisable
by preferences of the Gorman Polar Form. A little under 5% of the data (16 households) are not
rationalisable by well-behaved preference at all. Since it is a necessary condition for normative
aggregation that individual households act as if they are utility maximisers, we therefore set these
16 households to one side.16
Exact linear aggregation. We now ask whether the aggregate (macro) behaviour of the remain-
ing 95% of the original sample satisfy exact linear aggregation (or, equivalently, can be described
by a normative representative consumer that is independent of the income distribution rule). To
in mind, so much as the family; of course, some hardy souls will pursue the will-o￿ -the-wisp of sovereignty within
the family so as to reduce even these collective indi⁄erence curves to an individualistic basis￿. See Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2011) for a revealed preference characterisation of Chiappori￿ s (1988) model of collective
household consumption that starts from an individualistic basis.
15The commodity groups are (i) food and non-alcoholic drinks at home; (ii) alcohol; (iii) tobacco; (iv) energy at
home (heating by electricity); (v) services at home (heating: not electricity, water, furniture repair); (vi) nondurables
at home (cleaning products); (vii) non-durable medicines; (viii) medical services; (ix) transportation; (x) petrol; (xi)
leisure (cinema, theatre, clubs for sports); (xii) personal services; (xiii) personal nondurables (toothpaste, soap); (xiv)
restaurants and bars and (xv) traveling (holiday).
16An alternative would perhaps be to impose rationalisability on them. Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008)
describe a way to do this. In this case, and in view of the very small number of such households, we opted for
simplicity.
12do this we simply check the condition for exact linear aggregation that is given in Theorem 5, again
using a linear programming approach. Speci￿cally, we need to check for the data pooled across
households whether there exist numbers uh
t 2 R+ and bt 2 R++ such that, for all observations














where the parameter previously denoted by bh
t is now common across all households for the prices
pt (which corresponds to bh (p) = b(p) for all h). We ￿nd that this condition is rejected - the data
cannot be rationalised by a common bt parameter. Despite the fact that these households all satisfy
the necessary condition (Gorman Polar Form preferences) perfectly, and despite the very ￿ exible
nature of revealed preference tests, it seems that the data still cannot bear the weight of the theory
required for exact linear aggregation.
To the extent that variation in the bt parameter might be driven by observables, strati￿cation
might be a ￿ exible way in which to allow for this - the idea being that a representative consumer
might be valid when applied to sub-groups of demographically similar households, even though
when applied to the data in toto it is rejected. To investigate this further we allocated the data to
smaller homogeneous groups on the basis of observables such as their age pro￿les, schooling level,
household size and number of children. This resulted in 52 groups - some of them very small indeed.
Table 2 reports the group frequency for di⁄erent group sizes (measured as number of households).
For obvious reasons, we conduct aggregation tests only for the 34 groups which contain more than
one household. Although the number of di⁄erent households for a given stratum could be as small
as just two, even then we could not ￿nd any group that satis￿es the condition for aggregation.
This despite the fact that the strength of revealed preference tests in general (weakly) increases
with the number of observations, so that reducing the number of households involved in a test, by
considering only those with similar observables, should make it easier to rationalise behaviour with
a representative consumer. We take this to mean that, even in very small groups of demographically
similar households, the distribution of income plays an essential role in understanding group (macro)
behaviour.



















13Inter-household heterogeneity. This is the ￿rst time that Gorman￿ s aggregation conditions
have been tested in a revealed preference framework. As such, the result is very robust. It is worth,
therefore, considering for a moment the source of this rejection. All of the households used in our
test satis￿ed the conditions for rational preferences of the Gorman Polar Form, i.e. their behaviour




yh ￿ ah (p)
bh (p)
;
in which the price indices are allowed to be heterogeneous. Regarded as an a¢ ne function of
income, heterogeneity in the ￿intercept￿of the indirect utility function is not relevant to aggregation
considerations, but heterogeneity in the ￿slope￿index 1=bh (p) is.17 The prima facie reason that
the data fail to satisfy the conditions for aggregation must, therefore, be heterogeneity in the slope
of the indirect utility function with respect to income. Our revealed preference characterisation
allows us to investigate this a little further - in a way that naturally exploits the speci￿c panel
structure of our data set. We introduce a time-varying idiosyncratic heterogeneity parameter ￿h
t
to the slope index for each household. Then, we consider the problem of how much heterogeneity
around a common slope index is required in order to rationalise the data, and we therefore look at
the values "h


































Clearly, only when the stated condition for exact linear aggregation is satis￿ed, we have that
all the parameters "h
t equal zero in this problem. We already know from the previous results that
this is not the case for our dataset. Thus, our minimisation problem evaluates how close we can
come to this in a least-squares sense. The larger the solution values for "h
t , the further we are from
exact aggregation. Each parameter "h
t captures the (minimum) household-speci￿c deviation from
a common 1=b(p) index to obtain consistency with our conditions for exact linear aggregation. As
such, the distribution of the parameters "h
t over all households h e⁄ectively captures the minimal
heterogeneity underlying the observed violation of the conditions for exact linear aggregation.





t2￿ . Figure 1
shows a nonparametric estimate of the density of the distribution of the heterogeneity term "h
t . The
￿ve curves show the distribution for each of the ￿ve periods. The heterogeneity distribution is stable
across time and approximately symmetric as to be expected given our quadratic loss function, but
it fails a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality (we standardise the variable and test against a null
that the distribution is a standard normal). From Figure 1, we conclude that we need considerable
heterogeneity across households to rationalise the observed consumption behaviour. Recall too that
we have found only the minimal heterogeneity required for rationalisation. It therefore seems that
variation in the marginal utility of income is economically signi￿cant: certainly signi￿cant enough
to kill o⁄ the representative consumer - perhaps once and for all.
17Indeed, it is the requirement of a common ￿slope￿index (i.e. b(p) = bh (p) for all h) that drives the empirical
restrictions associated with exact linear aggregation. In revealed preference terms, this is particularly apparent from
Theorem 5 and Corollary 2. Here, we can draw a parallel with typical panel data regression models, which can allow
for cross-sectional heterogeneity in the intercept term (corresponding to ah (p) in our setting) while, for identi￿cation
purposes, they need to assume slope coe¢ cients to be the same cross-sectionally.
14Figure 1: Estimates of the density of heterogeneity terms "h
t (by period)











As an interesting side product, our minimum-distance procedure also provides solutions for bt
which is the value of the common component of the bh (pt) price index in each period. This is
reported in Table 3. As is clear from the table, the index b(pt) is roughly increasing over the ￿ve
time periods. This re￿ ects the increase of most nominal commodity prices over the time frame
considered.18
Table 3: Annual values of b(pt)
Period t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
b(pt) 0.2451 0.2402 0.2534 0.2594 0.2887
Finally, given a solution for 1=bt + "h
t , which is interpretable as a solution for the slope index
1=bh (pt), we can also describe the distribution of the implied idiosyncratic bh (pt) price index.
This is shown in Figure 2, which brings together the results in Figure 1 and Table 3. In line with
these earlier results, whilst the distribution of bh (pt) appears to be fairly stable over time, the
heterogeneity term swamps the variability in the common component of the index.




















The concept of the normative representative consumer has since long played a central role in many
areas in economics. Although the conditions for its existence have been argued to be demanding, it
18Following this interpretation, when considering the raw price data, we found that it is the decrease of a single
commodity price that drives the drop in the index b(pt) between periods 1 and 2.
15is fair to say that existing evidence is solely based on Gorman￿ s well-known exact linear aggregation
results within a functional-derivative based framework. To test Gorman￿ s conditions for exact linear
aggregation (which boil down to consumers having preferences of the Gorman Polar Form with an
equal marginal utility of income), one needs to make many additional assumptions to bring these
conditions to the data. In this paper, we revisited the exact aggregation problem by bringing in
tools from the revealed preference literature. These tools are based solely on the data at hand and
do not need any additional parametric or statistical assumptions. As such, they allow for robustly
analysing the empirical validity of exact aggregation.
In addition to a few interesting and rather important side results (like a revealed preference
characterisation of Gorman Polar Form preferences for an individual consumer), we proposed a
revealed preference test for the existence of a consumer that can normatively represent a set of con-
sumers regardless of the income distribution (i.e. exact linear aggregation). Interestingly, the test
is linear and thus easy to apply in practice. Our analysis also clari￿ed the relationship between the
empirical restrictions associated with Samuelson-type aggregation and Gorman-type aggregation.
Most notably, we made explicit the conditions under which the two notions of aggregation become
empirically equivalent.
We showed the practical usefulness of our revealed preference characterisation by means of an
empirical application to a Spanish balanced microdata panel. We could not ￿nd any evidence for
the existence of a normative representative consumer that is independent of the income distribution:
our data systematically reject the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for exact linear aggregation
even for groups with only two households. Given this negative result, we have subsequently analysed
the unobservable heterogeneity across households that drives the rejection. Speci￿cally, we have
used our revealed preference characterisation to reconstruct heterogeneous household-speci￿c price
indices which make exact aggregation impossible. Overall it seemed that the inter-household het-
erogeneity in the slope index of the indirect utility function is economically signi￿cant. This implies
that there is also important variation in the marginal propensity to consumer across households.
We take our results to mean that the distribution of income plays an essential role in understanding
group (macro) behaviour. As a consequence, our results may provide further ammunition to those
who wish to wipe out the normative representative consumer once and for all.
16Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.
(2:A) ) (2:B): First consider the implications of optimising behaviour and the ￿rst order con-




































pt. Now consider the concavity conditions for this structure
V (us) ￿ V (ut) + rV (ut)
































preserves the inequalities and gives
V (us) ￿ V (ut) + ￿tb0




















which are conditions (2:B:1) and (2:B:2).
(2:B) ) (2:A): Suppose we have numbers fVt;￿t > 0gt2￿ and H￿vectors fut;bt > 0gt2￿ such











h qh for some observation t. We need to show that there exists utility functions, with the
















: Using (2:B:2) we
can construct T upper bounds on uh ￿
qh￿
and if we take the minimum of these then we have, as in









































































qh we must have that b0
tut ￿ b0
tu. Using (2:B:1) we can then similarly construct the following
macro-utility function
V (u) = min
s
fVs + ￿sb0
s (u ￿ us)gs2￿ ￿ Vt + ￿tb0
t (u ￿ ut):
Since ￿tb0
t (u ￿ ut) ￿ 0 we obtain V (u) ￿ Vt as required:￿
Proof of Theorem 3.
(3:A) , (3:C). The condition (3:C) is simply (2:B:2) from Theorem 1 with the common marginal
utility of income requirement added. Condition (2:B:1) is redundant according to the following























t and ￿t = 1
bt then
Vs ￿ Vt = ￿tbt (10us ￿ 10ut)
17since ￿tbt = 1: Hence there exist numbers such that
Vs ￿ Vt + ￿tbt (10us ￿ 10ut)
which is (2:B:1) when bh
t = bt. Thus the conditions are equivalent to those in Theorem 2 with the
extra restriction that bh
t = bt.

















and note the lack of the h superscript on bt. The rest of the proof follows that for Theorem 2 to
give condition (2:B:2). Summing (2:B:2) across h and de￿ning Vt = 10ut gives












Vs = Vt + 10 (us ￿ ut)
which satis￿es condition (2.B.1) where we interpret ￿tbt = 1.￿
Proof of Theorem 4.
As a preliminary step, we provide an equivalent linear formulation of the conditions in (4:B):



































s=￿ if pt = ￿ps for ￿ > 0: (4.B.3￿ )
:






t2￿. Then, we can use wh
t = maxqfuh (q)jp0
tq ￿ p0
tqh








(4:B) ) (4:A) : Consider

















t2￿. Using (4.B.2￿ ),
we have







Let us then verify whether the function uh meets De￿nition 4. Consider some arbitrary prices
p0 and income yh



































































t pt + ￿p0 ￿ 0:
Let ￿
￿
t (t 2 ￿) and ￿
￿ de￿ne the optimum of program (5). In general, these optimal values are
independent of yh
0 when yh
0 respects boundary conditions that limit the domain of yh
0. In practice,
the boundary values for yh
0 can be determined by standard methodology for sensitivity analysis of
linear programming. (Technically, these bounds will correspond to the range of yh
0 (as the objective
coe¢ cient of ￿) for which the optimal basic feasible solution of the linear program (5) remains
constant.) These boundary conditions parallel the usual conditions that apply to indirect utility
functions representing Gorman Polar Form preferences; see our discussion following De￿nition 4 in
the main text.
Thus, because the solution of the problem (5) is independent of yh
0 (under the stated boundary
conditions), we conclude that the function wh in (5) meets the requirement in De￿nition 4 for
￿























Inspection of problems (4) and (5) reveals that the price indices ah and bh are linearly homogenous
of degree 1 (if again the same income boundary conditions hold).￿
Proof of Corollary 1.
As a ￿rst step, we note that the conditions (4:B:2) and (4:B:3) in Theorem 4 are void if pt 6= ￿ps
(￿ > 0) for all s;t. As such, rationalisability by Gorman Polar Form only requires consistency with
the condition (4:B:1). The equivalence between the statements (A) and (B) in Corollary 1 then
follows directly from the equivalence between statements (1:B) and (1:C) in Theorem 1.￿
Proof of Theorem 5.
This follows from Theorem 4 (i.e. each household is rationalisable by the Gorman Polar Form)
and the result of Gorman (i.e. the marginal utility of income is household independent, which is
captured by the common bt (i.e. bh
t = bt for all h)). ￿
19Proof of Corollary 2.
The result follows from combining Corollary 1 with Theorem 5.￿
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